A clause is not a pretext if it is seriously considered at the time of the agreement, even if the free holder`s motivation to accept it was to refuse sole possession and that a lease – seriously intended to be part of a genuine agreement which must be beneficial to it – does not matter as far as the motive – even if it must escape the law – change the behaviour in the light of the legislation. , the independent licensees (lawyers!) tried to circumvent the legislation by entering into agreements denying sole possession to the occupier – meaning that he did not meet the conditions that it was a rental agreement, so that a licence (which could not be decided under rent laws) « [T] the authorities lead me to the following conclusions. First, the correct wording is that of Lord Upjohn in Northern Ireland Comr of Valuation v Fermanagh Protestant Board of Education ( 3 All ER 352 at 359,  1 WLR 1708 to 1722), i.e. that, (a) it must be established that it is essential for the fulfilment of the officer`s duties to occupy the house in question, or (b) that it is an explicit period of remuneration for the job, that the officer can better fill the premises and thus better fulfil his obligations as a servant to a material extent. Falsification is a clause that was not seriously considered at the time of the agreement. The court was prepared to infer the intent necessary to establish the argument. The same approach was adopted by the English Court of Appeal in Cameron Limited/Rolls-Royce plc  EWHC 546 (Ch). This time, the license was included in a conditional agreement for the granting of a lease agreement. Again, the occupier`s assertion that the licence was in fact a lease agreement was unsuccessful. « The option gave Essex Plan the right to apply for the lease and therefore gave it a direct interest in the land in equity.
Their entry into the profession until the exercise or expiry of the option was related to this interest. It is therefore not necessary to infer the creation of a lease that would give Essex Plan another interest in the same country. (Hoffmann J, 356) – This changed in Street v Mountford (1985): The HOL decided that an agreement granting exclusive ownership to a fixed-term rent is necessarily a lease – facts: S gave M a exclusive ownership right – the agreement stated that he had a licence. – Hero: the judge found that the label was not negligible because it considered that the requirements of a tenancy agreement – motivated by the desire that rent laws have an area of operation – would not be negligible if a tenancy contract could be labelled as a licence and that one would fall outside the law only because of a label, Although the content was the same – Subject to the licensing exception if the employment (i) is based on charitable, family or friendship or (ii) employment contract ⇒ Before Street v Mountford , lawyers have attempted to circumvent rent laws (and thus circumvent landlords` obligations for their tenants) by qualifying a licensing contract.